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  Economic,  financial,  and  real  life decisions  involve options  that vary along  several 
distinct dimensions, such as the probability of  the outcomes, or  in the times at which the 
outcomes  will  be  delivered.  These  factors  affect  the  choices  of  different  individuals 




whether  and  how  the  preferences  of  the  same  individual  in  different  domains  of  choice, 
such  as  risk‐taking  or  saving,  might  be  related  to  each  other  (1‐4).  Psychologists  have 
studied  the  relationship  between  various  cognitive  skills  and  job  success,  among  other 
outcome  variables,  but  without  focusing  on  the  link  between  cognitive  skills  and 
preferences (5). Similarly,  little  is known about how cognitive skills  influence behavior in 





ambiguous  probability,  and  inter‐temporal  choices,  and  how  choices  in  these  distinct 
domains  are  related  to  each  other  in  a  large  sample  (N=1066)  of  trainee  tractor‐trailer 
drivers at a sizable U.S.  trucking company (see supporting online material  (SM) and (7)). 
We  also  examine  how  cognitive  skills  are  related  to  two  types  of  behavior  by  these 
subjects:  laboratory choices  in a strategic game, and an  important on‐the‐job decision.  In 
each  case  we  are  able  to  control  for  potentially  confounding  socio‐economic  and 
psychological  factors. Our results are enabled by a comprehensive data collection design, 
which  gives  the  opportunity  to  observe  socio‐economic,  demographic,  psychological, 
experiment‐based, and employment‐related outcome variables for the same subjects.   
We collected three measures of cognitive skills (CS’s): a non‐verbal IQ test (Raven’s 
matrices),  a  quantitative  literacy  (or  “numeracy”)  test  and  a  test  of  the  ability  to  plan 
(referred to as the "Hit 15" task). To measure risk preferences we used an experiment  in 
which  subjects  chose  between  various  fixed  payments  and  a  lottery,  and  for  ambiguity 
subjects  faced  the  same  choices  as  in  the  risk  experiment,  but  were  given  incomplete 
information about the probability of outcomes (8). Time preferences are measured from an 
experiment  in which  subjects  chose  between  earlier  but  smaller  payments  and  later  but 
larger ones. Our  laboratory behavioral measure of strategic behavior  is  from a sequential 
form of the Prisoner’s Dilemma: a first mover chooses whether to send $0 or $5 to a second 
mover, and the latter in turn decides how much to send back. In both instances the amount 
sent were doubled by  the  experimenter.    Subjects  stated  their  choices  in both  roles,  and 
their beliefs about the moves of others.   
Our  on‐the‐job  measure  of  behavior  results  from  our  access  to  internal  human 
resource data maintained by the firm: in a high‐turnover setting, we observe the length of 
time each subject remained with the company, and the reason for leaving.   
We  also  collected  a  demographic  and  socio‐economic  profile  and  a  standard 








translating  their  preferences  into  choices.  This  is  confirmed  by  examining  variations  in 









the highest quartile  in  the  IQ  index  increases  the  likelihood of being  consistent by about 
25%  in risky choice, and by about 18% in ambiguous choices (10). In choices over time the 










value of $10—is complex.    Its utility  is harder to evaluate, and so is noisy.   Similarly, $10 
paid immediately is simple, and its utility is clear, whereas $10 to be paid in two weeks is 
complex—multiple factors could intervene—and its utility is noisy.  
This  difference  in  perception  may  systematically  affect  choices.  If  evaluating  the 
overall utility of  a  complex option  is harder  for a  subject, he may  focus on  some specific 
aspect of it, which could guide his choice: of the two outcomes of $2 and $10 in our lottery 
he may  focus on  the  lower  (if  pessimistic),  or on  the higher  (if  optimistic).  Subjects who 
find a more  comprehensive evaluation easier will be more  likely  to  focus on  the average 
value. This systematic effect may have deep roots: an implication of several models of the 
decision process,  such as  the  random walk model  (13‐15),  is  that,  other  things  equal,  an 
option which is perceived more noisily is less likely to be chosen than one perceived more 
precisely.  
We  hypothesize  that  higher  cognitive  skills  are  associated  with  less  noise  in  the 
perception of the utility of complex options.   If this is correct, we should observe a higher 
concentration of  choices near  the  expected value  from subjects with higher  level  of CS's, 
and  among  those  with  lower  values  we  should  observe  the  effects  of  pessimism  or 
optimism, particularly in evaluating gains and losses, and of the simplification of options. In 





Risk  Aversion  (CRRA)  specification:  a  higher  coefficient  corresponds  to  higher  risk 




also  depends  on  CS’s,  and  is  smaller  in  subjects  with  higher  CS’s  (SM).  This  smaller 
difference in risk aversion levels across choices in different ranges of outcomes can be seen 
as another way  that  choice  consistency  increases with CS's. The  relationship between CS 
and  attitudes  to  risk  changes  qualitatively with  losses.  Subjects with  lower  CS  (who  are 
more  risk  averse  when  gains  are  at  stake)  become more  risk  seeking  in  the  domain  of 
losses than subjects who have higher CS’s (Figure 2, C and D).  
A  possible  confound  is  that  cognitive  skills  may  affect  choices  involving  money 
indirectly,  through  affecting  the  income  available  to  individuals.  Our  data  permit  us  to 









none of  the payments  is  immediate. This  evidence  cuts  against  the view  that higher CS’s 
increase patience through the control of impulsivity.  
Broadly, for lotteries with positive outcomes the willingness to take calculated risks 




those  who  always  prefer  the  sure  payment  is  one  standard  deviation  below  those  who 










subject  chooses  the  later  payment  (an  indicator  of  patience),  and  the  IQ  index  (see  SM).  
The latter index has a strong and significant correlation with all the choices. 
Cross  correlations  among  preferences  expressed  through  different  choices  in  the 
same domain  (for  example  choices over  time  for different  time horizons)  are  strong and 
significant.  Also  choices  under  risk  and  over  time  are  correlated,  particularly  among 
choices with positive outcomes and a short time horizon.   The single important exception 















accurately  predicted  first  mover  behavior,  with  almost  a  28%  increase  over  the  entire 
range of the index (18). The same holds for the prediction of return transfers by the second 
mover after a $5  transfer:  an  increase  in  the  IQ  index  increases  the value of  the  transfer 
predicted by the subject, and the distance between the true value and the predicted value 
decreases with higher IQ and numeracy scores (see SM).  The exception is the prediction of 






Subjects with higher  IQ  transfer  a higher  amount  after  a  transfer of  $5,  and  a  lower one 
after a  transfer of $0  (19). The behavior of  the  first mover  is also affected:  subjects with 
higher cognitive skills are more likely to send $5. A potential confound is that subjects with 
higher CS's  expect  a higher  return  to  sending $5,  and are more  inclined  to  take  risks,  so 
sending  $5  might  be  more  attractive  them  as  a  (purely)  financial  investment.  After 
correcting for this factor, the IQ index is positively and systematically related to first mover 




The  previous  results  are  based  on  abstract  choices  (e.g.  lotteries)  involving 
moderate  amounts  of  money,  made  in  a  controlled  laboratory  environment,  albeit  a 
temporary one placed  in  a  field  setting.    The  external  validity,  i.e.  the usefulness  of  such 
findings in predicting economic behavior outside the laboratory, is controversial.  Our data 
permit us to  test  this relationship, and we find strong support  for the external validity of 
our laboratory measures and experimental findings.   
In large firms of the type we study, the American Trucking Associations consistently 
report  that  annual  turnover  rates  exceed 100% (21). Most driver  trainees,  including our 
subjects,  borrow  the  cost  of  training  from  their  new  employer,  a  debt which  is  forgiven 




variable  (marital  status),  as well  as  for each quintile  for  the Hit 15  Index. The difference 
between married and un‐married is small, while the difference among the quintiles in any 
of  the  cognitive  skills  scores  is  large.  Marital  status  is  typical  of  other  socio‐economic 
variables, such as credit score, number of dependents, prior  job, and so on:  these explain 
little of  the variation  in survival. The survival curves are similar  for  the  IQ  Index and the 
Numeracy. The difference between survival  levels at different  scores  is particularly  large 
for the Hit 15 Index: the survival for the top scorers is twice as large as for the bottom ones.  
These  effects  are  robust  to  including  various  potentially  confounding  factors  as 
statistical  controls. A Cox proportional hazards  regression  including  the  three CS  indices, 
several  demographic  and  socio‐economic  variables  (age,  gender,  previous  experience, 
credit  score,  etc.)  and  indices  of  preferences  derived  in  the  experimental  session  (e.g. 
indices of risk and ambiguity aversion, and time preferences) shows that the variables with 
the largest and robustly significant effects are those measuring cognitive skill (see SM).  
Considering  different  exit  categories  using  the  Cox  proportional  hazards  model 
confirms  that  poor  ability  to  plan  is  a  key  link  between CS’s  and  exits. Departing during 





There  is  a  good  reason  for  the  size  of  the  effect  of  cognitive  skill  factors,  and 
especially  Hit  15.  This  index measures  the  ability  of  the  individual  to  effectively  reason 









In  a multivariate  analysis,  controlling  for  the  effect  of  cognitive  skills  on  exit  risk, 









lower error rates are associated with higher  levels of cognitive skills. But  if  this were the 
only  way  in  which  cognitive  skills  affect  preferences,  we  should  observe  only  a  larger 
variance in the choices made by those with lower cognitive skills, and no systematic effects, 
just as we do not see a systematic effect on the sum in addition problems.  
We have  found  that  the  relationship  is  deeper,  and  it may offer  an  explanation of 
economic  success  of  individuals.  Preferences  of  individuals  differ  systematically  with 
cognitive  skills:  higher  cognitive  skills  are  associated  with  a  larger  willingness  to  take 
calculated  risks  and  higher  patience.  As  a  consequence,  patience  and willingness  to  take 
risks  are  positively  correlated.  Cognitive  skills  are  also  associated  with  higher  social 
awareness and a greater tendency to be cooperative, so if they influence economic success, 
it  is  not  by  producing  blind  selfishness.  The  effect  is  substantial,  and  goes  well  beyond 
laboratory measures: we have seen how it can significantly affect job tenure. 
Economic  theory  has  so  far  considered  cognitive  skills  as  extremely  important 
variables, but they have only been treated as endowments that increase the set of feasible 
options  for  an  individual.  These  results  show  that  cognitive  skills  do  something  else: 
cutting across all domains of choice, they introduce systematic effects in, and correlations 
among, economic preferences.  
The  novel  relationships  we  find  have  potentially  deep  implications.  For  example, 
Gregory  Clark  recently  suggested  that  the  initial  location  of  the  industrial  revolution  in 
England may have been due to a ``survival of the richest’’ selection process, that operated 
there  from  as  early  as  1250 C.E.  (24).  This  selection may  have been  cultural,  genetic,  or 
both. He suggests that selection favored "capitalist" traits that  include several of the ones 
(e.g. risk taking and saving propensity) we analyze herein. Were these traits independent, it 
is hard to  imagine how a selection process could  induce such a bundled concentration  in 
the  time  frame  suggested.  But  if  these  traits  are  correlated  due  to  their  linkage  with 




involve  using  cognitive  skills  to  simultaneously  apply  attitudes  towards  risk  and  to  the 
allocation over time of future payments. Numerical skills are already known to significantly 
affect such decisions (1, 6), and our results generalize  this  finding.   The same holds  for a 
variety  of  problems  in  the  areas  of  health  insurance,  health  care,  and  investments  in 
education, and in the area of labor contracts and employment choices. The relationships we 
find between cognitive skills and economic preferences, and among economic preferences, 






Our data was collected  in a  temporary  laboratory set up  in a  company‐operated  training 







We  collected  three  different  measures  of  cognitive  skills  (CS’s)  (26).    The  first  was  a 
licensed  subset  of  Raven's  Standard  Progressive  Matrices  (SPM)  (27).  The  SPM  is  a 
measure  of  non‐verbal  IQ  consisting  of  a  series  of  pattern  matching  tasks  that  do  not 
require mathematical or verbal skill.  
The  second  was  a  section  of  a  standard  paper‐and‐pencil  test  for  adults  of 
quantitative  literacy,  or  "numeracy,"  from  the  Educational  Testing  Service.  Subjects  read 
and  interpreted  text  and  diagrams  containing  numerical  information,  and  did  arithmetic 
calculations, such as computing percentages, based on that information (28).  
The third instrument was a simple game, called Hit 15, played against the computer. 






fixed  payment  increased  in  value  with  each  choice,  while  the  lottery  was  constant:  a 
promise  to  pay  the  subject  either  a  higher  or  a  lower  dollar  amount,  such  as  $10  or  $2, 
depending on a random device which had a 50% probability  for each outcome.   Over the 
four sets of choices the amounts at stake varied between a gain of $10 and a loss of $5, so 
we  could  study  the  effects  of  stake  size,  and of  losses  as  compared  to  gains. We  identify 
preferences using the certainty equivalent method (30). The experiment on ambiguity was 
identical except that subjects knew less about the lotteries—only that each outcome had at 






ensuring  subjects  would  be  present  at  the  field  site  at  as  many  the  payment  dates  as 










sent would  be  doubled  by  the  experimenters  before  reaching  the  other  player.  The  first 
mover made an unconditional choice to send either none of the endowment ($0) or all of it 
($5).  The second mover made two separate choices about returning between $0 and $5 (in 
dollar  increments)  from  his  endowment,  one  in  case  the  first mover  had  sent  $0,  and  a 
second in case the first mover had sent $5.  
We also asked each subject what percentage of first movers would send $5, and also 





  The  length of  job tenure  is a key  indicator of economic success  for both  firm and 
driver‐trainee.    The  firm  has  at  stake  its  investment  in  recruiting  and  training  (between 
$5,000 and $10,000) and  its  reputation  in  the  labor market. The  trainee has at  stake  the 
debt  for  driver  training  (which  is  cancelled  after  12  months  of  service,  but  becomes 
immediately  payable  in  full  upon  earlier  exit),  his  job  record,  and  his  credit  history.    To 
address external validity we examine what affects the survival curve, which is an estimate 
of  the  proportion  of  the  initial  trainee  population  remaining  at  each  tenure‐length  that 
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Figure 1: IQ and economic preferences  
 
Blue lines represent unconditional averages by quartile of IQ. Green lines are regression-adjusted 
averages, controlling for demographic and socio-economic variables. Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering on individuals where more than one observation is used. 
Panel A: IQ and Consistency of choices 
Panel B: IQ and coefficient of relative risk aversion  
The coefficient is estimated from choices over lotteries with positive outcomes, under the 
assumption that the subject has a power utility function on monetary payments (known as 
Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility function). The reported coefficient is 1 minus this power: 
this coefficient is a measure of his risk aversion. 
Panel C: IQ and short-run time preferences.  
Panel D: IQ and long-run time preferences.  
Short and long-run discount factors are estimated according to the beta-delta model. In this 
model, payments in the future are discounted in two ways. All future payments have a common 
discount beta compared to present (today) payments. This factor measures the loss for the 
individual of not receiving an immediate payment. All future payments are discounted by the 
factor delta to the power of the distance in the future of the payment: this factor measures the 
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Figure 2:  
Panels A, B: Lower Cognitive Skills are associated with risk aversion in gains and risk 
seeking in losses 
We say that a subject chooses a fair gamble if he chooses the lottery when the expected value of 
the lottery is larger than the certain amount. The certain amount is interpreted as the opportunity 
cost of the lottery, so the subject chooses a fair gamble if the expected net gain is positive. The 
figure reports the fraction of choice of fair and unfair gambles with the (win 5/win 1) lottery 
(gains) and the (win 1/ lose 5) lottery (losses). Blue lines and green lines are as in Figure 1. 
  
Panels C, D: Cognitive Skills peak near risk neutrality 
Each of the seven categories on the horizontal axis is given by the number of times the subject 
chooses the lottery instead of the certain amount. This is a measure of the willingness to take 
risks. The vertical axis reports the mean IQ for each category, normalized to lie between 0 and 1. 



























Figure 3: Behavior in the sequential prisoner’s dilemma game 
Blue lines and green lines are as in Figure 1. 
 
Panel A First mover behavior 
The figure reports the mean transfer, by quartiles of IQ. The mean transfer of the first mover for 
the entire sample was 3.353 (SE 0.071). The difference in transfers between the two groups is 
significant, even after we control for the different beliefs that subjects have of the reciprocal 
transfer choices of the second mover, and different utility functions.  
Panel B Second mover behavior 
The figure reports the mean transfer of second movers, conditional on the transfer of the first 
mover, by IQ quartile. The bottom curve describes the response to a $0 transfer, and the top one 
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Figure 4, Panels A and B: IQ and survival in the firm 
The panels report the empirical estimate of the survival function (Kaplan-Meyer) for all types of 
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1 Methods
The data items collected in-person by the investigators were gathered during 23
Saturdays between December 5, 2005 and August 8, 2006, from driver trainees
in the middle of a two-week basic training course operated by the cooperating
firm at a location in the U.S. Midwest. Subjects took part in two 2-hour sessions
in groups of 18 to 30. Credit scores were available due to the credit contract
signed by trainees, and the firm provided these, along with weekly updates on the
employment status of the members of the subject pool, through April, 2007. This
data was collected for the ”New Hire Panel Study”, which is Research Component
Two of the Truckers & Turnover Project, and a more detailed account of the design
and of the context for the project may be found in [3].
1.1 Experimental Design
The part of the design utilized here includes the following components: three eco-
nomic experiments involving individual choices, an interactive game of strategy, a
cognitive skills measure in the form of a game against the computer, two conven-
tional cognitive skills measures, a personality profile, and a demographic profile. In
addition to a flat show-up fee ($10 at the beginning of each two-hour session), all
tasks except the personality profile and the demographic profile were compensated
on the basis of choices made or answers provided. Average total earnings were $53,
with a low of $21 and a high of $168.
Subjects
1,069 trainee drivers took part, which was 91% of those offered the chance to
participate. 3 of the subjects withdrew from the experiment, so the final sample
consisted of 1,066 subjects. Because adjustments were made to two tasks shortly
after data collection began, as noted below, the sample size is 892 when both these
measures are utilized.
Risk and Ambiguity Aversion
In the risk aversion experiment there were 24 choices divided into four blocks of
six choices each. There were two possible options for each choice: an amount of
money received with certainty, versus a lottery paying a higher dollar amount or a
smaller one, depending on whether a green or a blue chip was drawn from a bowl
publicly observed to contain five poker chips of each color. Subjects also chose
the color giving them the higher payoff, so the outcome was described as “a larger
amount if your color is drawn and a smaller amount if the other color is drawn”.
There were four lotteries,with the following pairs of monetary outcomes: (10, 2),
(5, 1), (5,−1), and (1,−5). The one question on which all subjects were paid was
drawn from a separate bowl with 24 numbered poker chips, prior to the draw of
the winning color.
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The experiment on ambiguity aversion used the same choices as the risk aver-
sion experiment, except that the subjects did not have full information on the
probability of the two outcomes of the lottery options. Instead, two blue poker
chips and two green poker chips were publicly placed in the bowl used to deter-
mine the winning color, and then out of sight of the subjects six more chips were
added, which could be all green, all blue, or any mixture thereof. As a result, sub-
jects only knew that there was at least a 20% chance that green would be drawn
and at least a 20% chance that blue would to be drawn. The rest of the design
was identical to the risk aversion task.
Time Preferences
In this experiment subjects had to make 28 choices, divided into four blocks of
seven choices each. There were two possible options for each choice, a smaller
amount of money paid earlier and a larger amount of money paid later. Each of
the four blocks of seven choices had the same format. The amount for the higher
payoff at a later date was in every case $80 and the amount for the lower payoff
at an earlier time varied between a maximum of $75 and a minimum of $45, with
decrements of $5. The experiment was always run on Saturday. The pair of dates
were respectively today (Saturday) vs. tomorrow (Sunday), today vs. Thursday,
Monday vs. a week from Monday, and Monday vs. 4 weeks from Monday. The
question for payment was drawn first from a bowl with 28 numbered chips, and
then the two subjects who were paid were selected by drawing from a separate bowl
of numbered chips. Subjects departed the training school on the Friday following
the data collection event, so the last two payments mentioned were made by mail
when subjects chose them.
Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma
The extensive form of the game is the following: Person 1 (the first mover) and
Person 2 (the second mover) each are allocated $5. Person 1 can send either $0
or $5 to Person 2, and Person 2 can respond by sending $0, $1, $2, $3, $4, or $5
back. All funds sent are doubled by the researchers.
Each subject made both an unconditional decision for the first mover role, and
a conditional one for the second mover role (first how to respond if the other sends
$0, and second how to respond if the other sends $5, doubled to $10.) Subjects were
randomly matched and their role selected by the computer, after their decisions.
This is a variant of the task used in [2].
Before each decision screen, subjects were also asked how they thought other
participants in the room would act in this experiment. The first question was
”What percent of the participants do you think will send their $5 as Person 1?”
and payed $1 if the subject was correct within plus or minus 5%. The second and
third questions were ”If Person 1 does not send/does send, what is the average
amount that participants in this room will send back?” and payed $1 each if the
subject was within plus or minus $0.25 of each of the two actual averages.
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Hit 15 Task
The Hit 15 task is a game between subject and computer. The computer and
the subject take turns adding points to the ”points basket” and in each turn the
subject or the computer must add either one, two, or three points to the points
basket. The goal is to be the first player to reach 15 points.
The game was played for five rounds, and the number of points in the points
basket at the beginning of the round varied, and the computer and participant
took turns going first. The first round was a practice round set to give the subjects
an example of how the first stage of backward induction works. The subjects were
paid $1 for each round that they won after the first. 892 subjects have a score on
this measure. This is the same game that is studied in [7].
IQ Measurement
The IQ instrument used is a licensed computerized adaptation of the Standard
Progressive Matrices (SPM) by J.C. Raven [14]. It consists of five sections (A-E),
each containing 12 questions. Each question is presented as a graphic image. On
top a large rectangular box contains some kind of a pattern with a piece missing
out of the lower right hand corner. On the bottom are six (or eight) possible pieces
that could be used to complete the image on top. Each section starts with easy
images, and becomes progressively more difficult, and the later sections are more
difficult than the earlier ones.
Due to the time constraints the first section of the SPM was omitted. In
addition, while we did not announce a time constraint at the beginning of the
SPM, we halted activity at 31 minutes, with a prior warning at 28 minutes. Initial
analysis showed that this affected the performance of a significant subset of subjects
on section E, so the score used herein is the sum of correct answers on sections B,
C, and D, scaled up by five thirds.
After both verbal and written instructions and two practice questions, subjects
filled out a ”confidence question” that asked how they thought they would do as
compared to other subjects in the room, i.e. in which quintile their score would
be (top 20%, bottom 20%, etc.) When the Raven’s task had been completed, the
same confidence question was asked again. Subjects were paid an additional $2 for
placing themselves in the correct quintile. In addition, two subjects were randomly
chosen to be paid $1 per correct answer, for a total possible earnings of $48 each
for their answers. 1,015 subjects have scores on this instrument
Numeracy
This instrument is part of the test of adult quantitative literacy from the Educa-
tional Testing Service. The full instrument consisted of two sections, of which only
the first section was used. The section was made up of 12 questions and subjects
were given exactly 20 minutes to complete the test. The test required subjects to
be able to add, subtract, compare numbers, fill out a form, and to be able to read
and understand a short problem, among other things.
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As with the non-verbal IQ, after instructions and a brief practice question,
subjects filled out a ”confidence question” that asked them how they thought
they would do as compared to other subjects in the room, by quintiles. When the
numeracy task had been completed, the same confidence question was asked again.
Subjects were paid an additional $2 for placing themselves in the correct quintile.
Two subjects were randomly chosen to be paid $2 per correct answer, for a total
possible earnings of $24 each for their question answers.
Personality Profile
The Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ) is a standard personality
profile instrument [12]. It consists of 11 different scales that represent the following
primary trait dimensions: wellbeing, social potency, achievement, social closeness,
stress reaction, alienation, aggression, control, harm avoidance,traditionalism, and
absorption. The short version used in the study has 154 multiple choice questions.
An example of one question would be, ”At times I have been envious of someone.”
Almost all of the 154 questions have the same four possible answers: ”Always
True”, ”Mostly True”, ”Mostly False”, and ”Always False”.
Demographic Profile
The investigators asked participants to answer a series of questions designed to
locate them within standard demographic categories (e.g. height, weight, age,
gender, and marital status), and to provide basic socio-economic information, such
as past experience in the labor market, and earnings information.
Credit Scores
The credit score is the FICO-98 (tm), purchased by the cooperating firm from the
Fair Isaac Corporation. 942 of the trainees had a credit score, and the balance
were reported to have insufficient identifiable data in their credit record to permit
the computation of the FICO-98.
Employment Status
The firm provided weekly updates through April 7, 2007, on the employment status
of the participants. This included a list of those who failed to complete the last
week of training (until one week after we stopped inducting new participants), and
also a list of those drivers who had completed training who had separated during
the week being reported. In both cases the data indicated whether the separation
was a voluntary quit or a discharge. See Table ?? for details.
Statistical Analysis
The analysis was conducted with Stata, Stata Corp, College Station, TX, Release
10/SE.
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1.2 List of Variables
Name of the Variable Description Range
Demographic
Age Age of the Subject 21 to 69
Married Marital Status { 0, 1}
Male Gender (=1 if male) { 0,1}
Height Height in inches 59 to 70
Weight Weight in pounds 110 to 351
Cognitive Abilities
IQIndex Normalized Score in the Sections B, C, D of the SPM test [0,1]
Numeracy Normalized Score in the Numerical Ability Test [0,1]
Hit15Index Normalized Score in the Hit15 test [0,1]
Experimental Economic Choice
PDSendP1 Amount sent as first mover { 0, 5}
PDSendP20 Amount sent as second mover, after $0 transfer { 0, 5}
PDSendP25 Amount sent as second mover, after $5 transfer { 0, 5}
RAAcc Choices of the Lottery in the Risky Choice {0, 24}
RAAcc Choices of the Lottery in the Ambiguous Choice {0, 24}
TPFut Choices of the Later Payment in the Time Choice {0, 28}
Table 1: List of the main demographic and experimental variables. The
range is the potential range of the variable. For instance, the IQIndex is a normal-
ization to [0, 1] obtained by dividing the variable by the maximum possible value.
The effective range of the variable is [0.277, 1]. A variable name preceded by an n
indicates that the variable has been normalized to have an effective range between
0 and 1, that is, if X is the value of the variable, nX = X−minX
maxX−minX . ,
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Name of the Variable Description Range
Socio-Economic Variables
YrsOfSchool Years of Schooling 7 to 18
OppIncome Income in an alternative usual job 5 to 75
Income Income from usual jobs 5 to 75
HouseholdIncome Sum of Income and OppIncome 10 to 150
ExperienceR Years of Experience on the Road 0 to 5
LongestDur Longest Duration in years in a company 0 to 40
LengthRJ Months in a regular job in the last two years 0 to 24
CreditRisk Credit Score (FICO98) 0 to 821













Table 3: List of MPQ and Psychological Variables.
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2 Preferences and IQ
In the section below we explain the procedures underlying the figures in the main
text, which establish a link between preferences and cognitive skill. The procedure
is based on two steps: first we estimate parameters describing the preferences, and
then we establish the relation between these parameters and a measure of cognitive
skill.
For the second step we run a regression in which the parameter value describing
the subject’s preference is the dependent variable, and the independent variables
are the indicator or dummy variables Iji, j, j = 1, ..., 4, for the quartiles of the
relevant cognitive skill; these take the value 1 for the quartile in which the subject
i falls, and 0 otherwise. The use of quartiles allows for potential non-linearities in
the relationship while keeping the regression specification simple and robust.
In order to make use of the data we have on other factors that could potentially
confound the relationhsips we are exploring, we estimate the coefficients γCSj asso-
ciated with the indicators Iji in two ways: ”raw” and ”adjusted”. The latter differs
from the raw estimate in that we add to the indicators a set of control variables
on the right hand side of the regression. The control variables are:
i. schooling, classifying subjects into the the following groups: middle school,
some college, technical school, college, graduate
ii. age and age squared
iii. household income (defined in section 1.2)
iv. gender
v. race, classifying subjects into the the following groups: African American,
American Indian, Asian, Latino, White
2.1 Consistency
We define as consistent an individual who displays at most one switching point
in each block of choices. In other words, if an individual i makes an inconsistent
choice in any one of the four blocks, we label him as inconsistent, and set the
corresponding variable consisi = 0; else this variable is equal to 1. We then
estimate a linear probability model
consisi = Iiγ
CS + xib+ ei (2.1)
where Ii is the vector of dummy variables for subject i’s quartile of cognitive
skill with γCS the vector of corresponding coefficients, xi is the vector of control
variables for subject i with bi the vector of corresponding coefficients, and ei is an
error term. To display the impact of cognitive skills on the frequency of consistent
choices, in Figure 1, Panel A we plot the four estimated values of γCSj , with their
standard error bands, both with and without the control variables.
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2.2 Choices under Uncertainty
We use the two blocks of choices in the experiment on choice under uncertainty in
which the lotteries have positive outcomes to obtain two measures of relative risk
aversion for each individual. The subjects have to decide between a safe option
and a 50/50 gamble in which they can win $10 or $2 in one choice block, and a
50/50 gamble in which they can win $5 or $1 in the other. For each block, we
calculate the coefficient of relative risk aversion needed to rationalize the choice
the individual made, assuming a CRRA utility function.
Specifically, in block 1, a subject has to choose between each of a monotonically
increasing sequence of sure payments pj, and a 50/50 gamble in which he can
either win $10 or win $2. Suppose individual i takes the gamble at step h, but
switches to the certain amount at step h + 1. We assume that the individual
would be indifferent between the gamble and the certain payment at the midpoint
0.5ph+0.5ph+1 between the two certain payments ph and ph+1. We further assume




where c is consumption in dollars and σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
We solve for the corresponding coefficient of relative risk aversion σi:
0.5u(10) + 0.5u(2) = 0.5u(ph) + 0.5u(ph+1) (2.3)
We conduct the analogous procedure to calculate the coefficient of relative risk
aversion in the case of the lottery in which an individual can win either $5 or $1.
With these two calculated values of σ for each individual at hand, we estimate the
following regression of σ on the quartiles of cognitive skill and control variables:
σi,k = αkIk + γ
CS
i Ii + xib+ ei,k (2.4)
where σi,k was calculated as specified above for individual i in choice k, Ik is a vector
of dummy variables, one for each of the two choice blocks described above (win
10/win 2 or win 5/win1), with the corresponding vector of ”fixed effect” coefficients
αk, Ii is the vector of four dummy variables for the quartiles of cognitive skill, with
γCS the vector corresponding coefficients, and ei,k is an appropriate error term.
The γCSj ’s, together with their estimated standard errors, are plotted in Figure 1,
Panel B, both with and without the usual set of control variables. Because we use
two different σi,k values that were calculated for the same individual, we adjust the
standard errors for clustering on individuals.
2.3 Choices over Time
To allow for a possible difference between short-term and long-term discounting,
we adopt the model of (β, δ)-preferences proposed in [13] and in [10]. If an indi-
vidual has (β, δ)-preferences then the amount x such that he is indifferent between
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receiving x earlier or receiving $80 after t days is given by
u(x) = βδtu(80) (2.5)
if the earlier payment occurs today, and
u(x) = δtu(80) (2.6)
otherwise. Taking logs, we get
log u(x)− log u(80) = I log β + t log δ (2.7)
where I = 1 if the earlier payment occurs today, and 0 otherwise.
In order to estimate β and δ, we assume that u is approximately linear over
the relevant range. Then we can write the relationship between xi and individual
i’s discount factors βi and δi in choice k as:
log xi,k − log 80 = Ik log βi + tk log δi + ei,k (2.8)
where ei,k is an appropriate error term. We let both discount factors depend on
cognitive abilities, and estimate a separate discount factor for each quartile of
cognitive abilities. In particular, for the short-term discount factor β, we specify




j + xib (2.9)
where Ib is the vector of four dummy variables for the four quartiles of cognitive
skill, with bCSj) the corresponding coefficients. Similarly, for the long-term discount
factor δ, we specify




j + xib. (2.10)
We substitute equations 2.9 and 2.10 into 2.8, and estimate the resulting equa-
tion using OLS. Because each individual makes 4 choices, we adjust the standard
errors for clustering on individuals, as the distinct residuals for an individual can-
not be viewed as independent. The resulting estimates of the (short term) bCSj ’s
are presented in Figure 1, Panel C, while the (long term) dCSj ’s are in Panel D,
both with and without the control variables.
Gains and Losses
We define two measures for risk preferences: the fraction of fair gambles accepted,
and the fraction of unfair gambles accepted. We define a fair (unfair) gamble as a
choice in which the uncertain payoff has a higher (lower) expected value than the
sure option. We say that a subject accepts a fair (unfair) gamble if he chooses the
lottery as opposed to the certain payment in the relevant case. For example, in
the risk experiment choice block involving the lottery (win $5/win $1), there are
four fair gambles, and one unfair gamble. If an individual accepted 3 of the fair
gambles, the fraction of fair gambles accepted is 0.75.




j + xib+ ei (2.11)
where the quartile dummy variables and related coefficients, and the control vari-
ables and related coefficients, are both defined as in previous sections. The two
lotteries of interest are the (win $5/lose $1) and (win $1/lose $5) ones. We repeat
these estimations with the fraction of unfair gambles taken as the dependent vari-
able for the two lotteries. Figure 2, Panels A and B display the resulting coefficient
estimates for the γCSj) ’s, with estimated standard errors, again with and without
control variables.
Cognitive Skills and Risk Attitudes
Our data suggest that the relation between cognitive skills and risk preferences
is non-monotonic. To see this, we plot the predicted CS level as a function of
the number of risky choices a subject made in a particular lottery experiment.
Specifically, we estimate the following regression of the index of CS used here, the
IQ score, on a vector of dummy variables capturing the number of the times the
subject chooses the lottery:
CSi = γkiIi(made k risky choices) + xib+ ei (2.12)
Since an individual can make between zero and six risky choices, there are seven
elements in the vectors γkiIi of dummy variables and associated coefficients. As in
the estimates described in the subsections above, we run a specification of 2.12 both
with and without the usual set of control variables xi. Furthermore, we estimate
2.12 separately for the choices involving the (win $10/win $2) and (win $5 / win
$1) lotteries. The results are displayed, with estimated standard errors, in Figure
2, Panels C and D.
2.4 Strategic Behavior
Method for the First-Mover
The dependent variable is the amount sent by the first mover. The amount is
either $0 or $5. Thus, we estimate the regression
senti = Iiγ
CS
j + xib+ ei (2.13)
where senti is the amount sent by the first-mover, and Ii is the standard vector
of four dummy variables for the four quartiles of CS, together with associated
coefficients γCSj , and the control variables are defined as usual. As in previous
estimates, we run a specification of 2.13 with and without the control variables xi.
Method for the Second-Mover
The dependent variable is the amount returned by the second mover. Since the
second-mover can condition his choice on the first-mover’s amount sent, we have
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to estimate two regressions. We estimate the equation
returni5 = Iiγ
CS
j(i) + xib+ ei (2.14)
where returni5 is the amount returned by the second mover if the first mover sent
$5, and the other variables are defined as in the previous equation. As usual, we run
a specification of 2.14 with the control variables xi. We also estimate the analogue
to 2.14 for the case in which the first mover did not send any money. Figure
3, Panels A and B, displays the results coefficient estimates γCSj with estimated
standard error bands.
13
3 Preferences and Cognitive Skills
Summary Statistics on Cognitive Skills
Figure 1: Distribution of the score for the IQ test (Raven’s matrices) in the sample
of subjects and in the general population, according to the SPM sampling.
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Factors affecting Cognitive Skills
IQIndex Numeracy Hit15Index
b/se b/se b/se
White 0.0428*** 0.130*** 0.183***
(0.013) (0.019) (0.027)
Male –0.0299** –0.024* 0.083
(0.015) (0.023) (0.032)
nAge –0.128*** 0.021 –0.289***
(0.021) (0.032) (0.045)
nSHeight 0.0111 0.062 0.117*
(0.0273) (0.068) (0.057)
constant 0.829*** 0.581*** 0.416***
(0.023) (0.035) (0.049)
R2 0.048 0.052 0.104
N 839 841 835
Table 4: Factors affecting IQ, Numeracy and Hit 15 Score. The nAge variable
is the variable Age normalized to be between 0 and 1. The variable nSHeight
is obtained in two steps. First we subtract the mean of the variable Height for
subjects of the same gender from the variable of the subject. Then the variable is
normalized to be between 0 and 1, to obtain nSHeight .
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Factor Analysis of Cognitive Abilities
The next tables show that the three measures of cognitive skills we use are signif-
icantly and strongly correlated. Factor analysis shows a single factor for the three
variables.
Variable Factor 1 Uniqueness Proportion Cumulative
Factor1 1.1828 1.3126 1.3906 1.3906
Factor2 -0.1298 0.0725 -0.1527 1.2380
Factor3 -0.2024 . -0.2380 1.0000
Table 5: Factor analysis and correlation. Number of observations = 886. LR test:
independent vs. saturated: χ2(3) = 496.62, Prob> χ2(3) = 0.00001. Only one
factor has eigenvalue larger than 1.




Table 6: Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances.
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Consistency of Choices
Consistency of Choices in Time, Risk and Ambiguity
Cons. Time Cons. Risk Cons. Amb.
me/(se) me/(se) me/(se)
IQ Index 0.1226** 0.3048*** 0.1991**
(0.0616) (0.1041) (0.0737)
Hit15 Index 0.0231 0.0529 0.0256
(0.031) (0.0466) (0.0353)










Prob > χ2 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001
N 884 884 884
Table 7: Logit regression of the consistency of choice. The variable Cons. Time
is equal to 1 if the subject is consistent in all the time choices, Cons. Risk is
the correspondent variable for risky choices, and Cons. Amb. is the variable for
ambiguous choices. The independent variables, IQIndex, Numeracy and Hit15
Index are all normalized to take values in the unit interval. The table reports the
marginal effects.
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Consistency of Risk Aversion with High and Low Stakes
distance distance distance
b/se b/se b/se










cons 1.773*** 1.740*** 2.056***
(0.227) (0.239) (0.284)
R2 0.015 0.019 0.106
N 1013 884 884
Table 8: Regression of the distance between the coeafficient of risk aversion with
lower and higher stakes. The variable distance is the square of the difference
between the two coefficients.
18
3.1 Choices under Uncertainty
Risk Acc. Risk Acc. Risk Acc.
b/se b/se b/se
IQIndex 0.974*** 0.945** 1.017**
(0.363) (0.377) (0.468)
















constant 3.594*** 3.488*** 3.059***
(0.477) (0.652) (0.701)
R2 0.010 0.013 0.016
N 1016 1014 884
Table 9: Variables affecting choices under risk, with lottery ($10, $2). The de-
pendent variable RiskAcc. is the number of choices of the lottery over the certain
amount. See the section 1.2 for a definition of the independent variables.
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Risk Acc. Risk Acc. Risk Acc.
b/se b/se b/se
IQIndex 1.880*** 1.423** 0.361
(0.585) (0.600) (0.738)
















constant 2.511*** –0.361 –0.698
(0.768) (1.036) (1.106)
R2 0.016 0.044 0.061
N 1016 1014 884
Table 10: Variables affecting choices under risk, with lottery ($5, $1). The de-
pendent variable RiskAcc. is the number of choices of the lottery over the certain
amount. See the section 1.2 for a definition of the independent variables.
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Risk Acc. Risk Acc. Risk Acc.
b/se b/se b/se
IQIndex 0.177 0.360 0.744
(0.406) (0.421) (0.521)
















constant 4.638*** 4.949*** 4.511***
(0.533) (0.728) (0.781)
R2 0.001 0.008 0.009
N 1016 1014 884
Table 11: Variables affecting choices under risk, with lottery ($5,−$1). The de-
pendent variable RiskAcc. is the number of choices of the lottery over the certain
amount. See the section 1.2 for a definition of the independent variables.
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Risk Acc. Risk Acc. Risk Acc.
b/se b/se b/se
IQIndex –2.623*** –2.487*** –1.175*
(0.485) (0.505) (0.620)
















constant 4.585*** 4.940*** 4.981***
(0.637) (0.871) (0.929)
R2 0.028 0.029 0.045
N 1016 1014 884
Table 12: Variables affecting choices under risk, with lottery ($1,−$5). The de-
pendent variable RiskAcc. is the number of choices of the lottery over the certain
amount. See the section 1.2 for a definition of the independent variables.
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3.2 Choices over Time
Future Pay. Acc. Future Pay. Acc. Future Pay. Acc.
b/se b/se b/se
IQIndex 1.873*** 1.505*** 0.420
(0.478) (0.490) (0.581)
















constant 4.199*** 1.676** 1.744**
(0.627) (0.846) (0.870)
R2 0.016 0.047 0.071
N 1016 1014 884
Table 13: Variables affecting choices over time, today vs. tomorrow. The depen-
dent variable FuturePay.Acc. is the number of choices of the future payment over
the earlier one. See the section 1.2 for a definition of the independent variables.
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Future Pay. Acc. Future Pay. Acc. Future Pay. Acc.
b/se b/se b/se
IQIndex 2.387*** 2.025*** 0.587
(0.541) (0.554) (0.669)
















constant 3.414*** 1.025 1.132
(0.710) (0.956) (1.003)
R2 0.022 0.055 0.090
N 1016 1014 884
Table 14: Variables affecting choices over time, today vs. in 5 days. The dependent
variable FuturePay.Acc. is the number of choices of the future payment over the
earlier one. See the section 1.2 for a definition of the independent variables.
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Future Pay. Acc. Future Pay. Acc. Future Pay. Acc.
b/se b/se b/se
IQIndex 2.356*** 1.852*** 0.825
(0.575) (0.588) (0.716)
















constant 2.372*** –0.204 –0.441
(0.755) (1.015) (1.073)
R2 0.018 0.052 0.074
N 1016 1014 884
Table 15: Variables affecting choices over time, in 2 days vs. in 9 days. The
dependent variable FuturePay.Acc. is the number of choices of the future payment
over the earlier one. See the section 1.2 for a definition of the independent variables.
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Future Pay. Acc. Future Pay. Acc. Future Pay. Acc.
b/se b/se b/se
IQIndex 1.880*** 1.423** 0.361
(0.585) (0.600) (0.738)
















constant 2.511*** –0.361 –0.698
(0.768) (1.036) (1.106)
R2 0.016 0.044 0.061
N 1016 1014 884
Table 16: Variables affecting choices over time, in 2 days vs. in 30 days. The
dependent variable FuturePay.Acc. is the number of choices of the future payment
over the earlier one. See the section 1.2 for a definition of the independent variables.
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Immediacy and IQ
The dependent variable in the next regression is computed in two steps. First we
determine the empirical correspondent of the present value to the subject of the
future payment. This is the amount in dollars x with the following property: a
decision maker who is indifferent between the value x paid at the earlier date and
the value $ 80 paid at the later day would have the same pattern of choice as the
subject. The variable that we study is the log of the ratio between this x for the
subject and $80. This is a measure of patience: the higher the value the more the
subject is willing to postpone payments.
For each subject we have now 4 variables, each corresponding to one of the
four choices over time. The regression below is the robust regression of the log of
the ratio just defined on the set of independent variables indicated (with standard












Table 17: The effect of IQ on time preferences is not affected by the presence of
an immediate payment. The left column reports the regression for choices where
the earlier payment is in two days, the right column for choices where the earlier
payment is today.
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4 Correlation among Preferences
4.1 Correlation among Preferences over Risk
The next figure shows the lowess ([4]) scatter-plot of the coefficient of risk aversion
for the lottery with lower stakes ($5, $1) and the same coefficient for the lottery
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Figure 2: The Two coefficients of Risk Aversion.
Since the coefficient for the lower stakes lottery is on average lower (as we
have seen in Figure 2 of the main text) the scatter-plot shows that the data for
the variable sigmaL are left censored. This suggests that the correct regression
analysis of the relationship between the two variables is a tobit regression. The










Table 18: The Coefficients of Risk Aversion.σL and σH are the estimated coefficients
of risk aversion in the Lower ($ 5, $ 1) and Higher ($ 10, $ 2) stakes lottery.
The tobit regression gives a coefficient of 1 between σL and σH : the coefficient
of risk aversion for lower stakes is simply the translation of the one for the higher
stakes by a −0.94 value. The R2 reported for the tobit regression is the estimated
one, not McFadden’s pseudo-R2.









Table 19: The Correlation among choices. RAAccH is the number of times the
subject chooses the lottery instead of the certain amount in the higher stakes
lottery; RAAccL is the same for the lower stakes lottery.
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Table 20: The Correlation among choices. TPFut1 is the number of times the
subject chooses the future payment instead of the immediate payment in the first
time choice (Today vs. Tomorrow); TPFut2 is the same for the second time choice
(Today vs. in 5 days).
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4.3 Correlation among Preferences in Different Domains
The correlation among preferences in different domains (shown in Figure 2 of the
test) may be due only to the common effect of the cognitive skills on the preferences,
or, in addition to the effect of CS, there may also be a deeper relationship among
the preferences. The regression results in Table 4.3 show that the second is a
likely possibility. The regressions examine the possible correlation of risk and time
preferences, once the effects of the IQ Index are taken into account.
TPFut1 TPFut2 TPFut3 TPFut4
b/se b/se b/se b/se
RAAccPH 0.055 0.052 0.056 0.118**
(0.041) (0.047) (0.050) (0.050)
IQ Index 1.845*** 2.416*** 2.350*** 1.885***
(0.477) (0.540) (0.574) (0.583)
constant 3.755*** 2.437*** 1.689*** 0.917*
(0.406) (0.461) (0.489) (0.497)
R2 0.017 0.022 0.018 0.017
N 1016 1016 1016 1016
Table 21: Regression of time choices over risk acceptance and IQ Index. The
variables TPFuti, for i = 1, .., 4 and RAAccPH are as defined in Figure 2 of the
text.
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5 Strategic Behavior and Cognitive Skills




 Figure 3: Description of the Game: There are two players, the first and second
movers, who move in sequence. They are both endowed with $5 by the experi-
menter. The first mover has to decide unconditionally whether to transfer $0 or $5
to the second mover. The second mover has to decide, before he knows the decision
of the first mover, how much he would transfer back, with a separate decision for
each of the two possible first mover actions. All amounts sent by either player
are doubled by the experimenter. Subjects gave their decisions for both roles first,
after which each subject was assigned one of the two roles at random, and was
then randomly matched with another subject who was assigned to the opposite
role. Subjects were paid according to the relevant choice each made, in the roles
assigned. Subjects also had to report their beliefs about the likely choices of the
other players in the room, and were paid for correctness of their guess.
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5.1 Beliefs and Behavior in the Game
Perc. Sending Perc. Sending
b/se b/se





















Table 23: Beliefs of the second mover: Subject’s estimate of the amount sent back
after a transfer of $0.
The independent variable is the answer to the following question: If Person 1
does send $0, what is the average amount that participants in this room will send













Table 24: Beliefs of the second mover: Subject’s estimate of the amount sent back
after a transfer of $5.
The independent variable is the answer to the following question: If Person 1
does send $5, what is the average amount that participants in this room will send











constant 40.414*** 40.746*** 39.449***
(3.451) (3.459) (3.640)
R2 0.011 0.012 0.011
N 1013 1013 884
Table 25: Beliefs of the first mover: Distance between the predicted and true
frequency of subjects sending $5 as first movers.
The variable Distance is the absolute value of the difference between the per-











constant 1.496*** 1.548*** 1.201****
(0.226) (0.225) (0.159)
R2 0.000 0.010 0.005
N 1013 1013 884
Table 26: Beliefs of the second mover: Distance between estimate and true mean
in the $0 transfer.
The variable Distance is the absolute value of the difference between the Amount











constant 2.046*** 2.115*** 1.840****
(0.243) (0.242) (0.163)
R2 0.003 0.018 0.016
N 1013 1013 884
Table 27: Beliefs of the second mover: Distance between estimate and true mean
in the $5 transfer.
The variable Distance is the absolute value of the difference between the Amount
estimated by the subject in the event of a $0 transfer and then true mean, which
is $3.629.
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5.2 Behavior as First Mover



















Table 28: Logit regression on the decision to send the $5 as first mover: Marginal
effects of IQ.
The variable diff is the difference between the expected value of sending $5 and
sending $0, computed according to the estimated quantity returned by the second
mover that the subject has indicated in the elicitation of his beliefs. The variable
IQ is the IQ index. The variable diffIQ is the product of diff and IQ.
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Table 29: Logit regression on the decision to send the $5 as first mover: Marginal
effects of the index of Cognitive Skill
The variable diff is the difference between the expected value of sending $5
and sending $0, computed according to the estimated quantity returned by the
second mover that the subject has indicated in the elicitation of his beliefs. The
variable CSI is the factor identified in the factor analysis of Cognitive Abilities.
The variable diffCSI is the product of diff and CSI.
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5.3 Behavior as Second Mover
Amount Amount Amount Amount
b/se b/se b/se b/se
IQ Index –2.383*** –2.108*** –2.142*** –1.800***
(0.453) (0.526) (0.563) (0.577)














constant 3.634*** 3.662*** 3.622*** 2.316***
(0.369) (0.370) (0.390) (0.587)
R2 0.027 0.028 0.037 0.063
N 1013 1013 884 881
Table 30: Behavior as Second Mover, After a $0 transfer.
The variable Amount is the monetary amount that the subject decides to send
back to the first mover if he transferred $0.
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Amount Amount Amount Amount
b/se b/se b/se b/se
IQ Index 1.321*** 0.829* 0.758 1.068**
(0.423) (0.490) (0.526) (0.542)














constant 2.569*** 2.520*** 2.486*** 1.006*
(0.345) (0.345) (0.364) (0.551)
R2 0.010 0.013 0.016 0.034
N 1013 1013 884 881
Table 31: Behavior as Second Mover, After a $5 transfer.
The variable Amount is the monetary amount that the subject decides to send
back to the first mover if he transferred $5.
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6 Analysis of Exits from the Company
Of the 1069 subjects that participated in the study, a total of 653 had left the
company by 4/07/2007. The table below presents a breakdown of the total exits in
three different ways, depending on whether the exit was voluntary or not, whether
it was before or after completion of training, and on whether the worker gave notice
of the exit. The final group, MIAQuit, are the “Missing in Action” drivers who
left the company without notice.
Name of the Variable Description Number
AllExits all exits at any time for any reason 653
Discharge all involuntary exits, at any time 162
VolQuit all voluntary exits, at any time 491
JobExit all on-the-job exits, for any reason 539
TrngExit all in-training exits, for any reason 114
MIAQuit all those who left without notice, at any time 142
Table 32: Reasons for exits from the job or training out of the total 1069 partici-
pants. The numbers are as of 4/07/2007.
6.1 Empirical Estimates of the Survival rate
The hazard rate h(t) is as usual the ratio of the instantaneous failure rate f(t) and




The empirical estimate of the survival rate S(t) used in the Figures in the test is
the Kaplan-Mayer estimator ([9]).
The estimated hazard rate for a subject with a vector of independent variables
x is assumed to be, following the Cox proportional hazard model,
h(t|x) = h0(t) exp(β · x)
The baseline hazard h0(t) is common to all subjects. The vector of parameters
β is estimated and indicates the effect of the individual values of the variables x.
The estimated effects of each independent variable shift the baseline hazard up or
down, so a hazard rate larger than 1 indicates an increase of the hazard rate with
respect to the baseline, a rate equal to 1 means no effect, and a rate strictly less
than 1 indicates a reduction of the hazard rate with respect to the baseline.
As noted in the test, the Kaplan Meyer survival rates show that survival is
increasing in the cognitive skill scores. The single exception is the group in the
top quintile of the Numeracy scale: individuals in this group have a survival rate
smaller than the next lower group. It is natural to imagine that a very high score
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in numeracy makes it convenient for the driver to look for a different, perhaps more
qualified, occupation, hance it may induce quitting. To keep into account the non-
monotonic effect of numeracy, in the regressions below we introduce each quintile
in Numeracy as a separate regressor. The non monotonic effect is confirmed: the
survival rate of all numeracy quintiles have a higher hazard rate (lower survival)
then the fourth.
6.2 Early and Late Exits
Variable Haz. Ratio St. Err. z p-value
Hit15Index 0.572 0.095 -3.35 0.001
IQ Index 0.547 0.198 -1.67 0.095
NumQuint1 1.418 0.256 1.94 0.053
NumQuint2 1.431 0.230 2.23 0.026
NumQuint3 1.349 0.202 2 0.046
NumQuint5 1.490 0.288 2.06 0.039
Age 1.003 0.005 0.6 0.549
Married 0.944 0.087 -0.63 0.527
Male 1.009 0.141 0.06 0.951
RAAcc 0.992 0.009 -0.84 0.398
AAAcc 1.006 0.009 0.65 0.513
TPFut 0.996 0.005 -0.69 0.489
CreditRisk 1.000 0.000 -0.29 0.775
ExperienceR 0.964 0.027 -1.34 0.179
Table 33: Hazard ratio for All Exits (AllExits): Cognitive Skills, Demographic and
Socioeconomic variables. RAAcc is the total number of times the subject chooses
the lottery in the Risky choice, and AAAcc the same for the Ambiguous choices.
TPFut is the total number of times the subject chooses the further payment.
CreditRisk is the Credit score of the driver. ExperienceR is the length of previous
experience in on-road driving.
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Variable Haz. Ratio St. Err. z p-value
Hit15Index 0.350 0.126 -2.92 0.004
IQIndex 0.536 0.381 -0.88 0.38
NumQuint1 2.438 1.161 1.87 0.061
NumQuint2 2.325 1.042 1.88 0.06
NumQuint3 1.826 0.797 1.38 0.168
NumQuint5 2.272 1.149 1.62 0.105
Age 1.040 0.010 4.08 0.0001
Married 0.823 0.161 -1 0.319
Male 0.919 0.247 -0.31 0.753
RAAcc 0.984 0.019 -0.84 0.403
AAAcc 0.998 0.015 -0.1 0.918
TPFut 0.990 0.010 -0.95 0.34
CreditRisk 1.000 0.000 0.68 0.498
ExperienceR 0.813 0.049 -3.44 0.001
Table 34: Hazard ratio for Exits during Training (TrngExit): Cognitive Skills,
Demographic and Socioeconomic variables.
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Variable Haz. Ratio St. Err. z p-value
Hit15Index 0.640 0.120 -2.39 0.017
IQIndex 0.548 0.217 -1.52 0.129
NumQuint1 1.320 0.259 1.41 0.158
NumQuint2 1.342 0.233 1.7 0.09
NumQuint3 1.308 0.212 1.66 0.097
NumQuint5 1.419 0.301 1.65 0.099
Age 0.993 0.006 -1.18 0.237
Married 0.980 0.099 -0.2 0.844
Male 1.029 0.161 0.19 0.853
RAAcc 0.994 0.010 -0.57 0.569
AAAcc 1.007 0.010 0.73 0.465
TPFut 0.998 0.006 -0.34 0.736
CreditRisk 1.000 0.000 -0.47 0.64
ExperienceR 1.003 0.031 0.1 0.919
Table 35: Hazard ratio for Exits on the Job (JobExit): Cognitive Skills, Demo-
graphic and Socioeconomic variables.
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